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One Sentence Summary: We propose to change the default P-value threshold for 
statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005. 
 
 
Main Text:  
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The lack of reproducibility of scientific studies has caused growing concern over 
the credibility of claims of new discoveries based on “statistically significant” findings. 
There has been much progress toward documenting and addressing several causes of this 
lack of reproducibility (e.g., multiple testing, P-hacking, publication bias, and under-
powered studies). However, we believe that a leading cause of non-reproducibility has not 
yet been adequately addressed: Statistical standards of evidence for claiming discoveries 
in many fields of science are simply too low. Associating “statistically significant” findings 
with P < 0.05 results in a high rate of false positives even in the absence of other 
experimental, procedural and reporting problems. 
For fields where the threshold for defining statistical significance is 𝑃 < 0.05, we 
propose a change to 𝑃 < 0.005 . This simple step would immediately improve the 
reproducibility of scientific research in many fields. Results that would currently be called 
“significant” but do not meet the new threshold should instead be called “suggestive.” 
While statisticians have known the relative weakness of using 𝑃 ≈ 0.05 as a threshold for 
discovery and the proposal to lower it to 0.005 is not new (1, 2), a critical mass of 
researchers now endorse this change. 
We restrict our recommendation to claims of discovery of new effects. We do not 
address the appropriate threshold for confirmatory or contradictory replications of existing 
claims. We also do not advocate changes to discovery thresholds in fields that have already 
adopted more stringent standards (e.g., genomics and high-energy physics research; see 
Potential Objections below). 
We also restrict our recommendation to studies that conduct null hypothesis 
significance tests. We have diverse views about how best to improve reproducibility, and 
many of us believe that other ways of summarizing the data, such as Bayes factors or other 
posterior summaries based on clearly articulated model assumptions, are preferable to P-
values. However, changing the P-value threshold is simple and might quickly achieve 
broad acceptance.    
 
 Strength of evidence from P-values 
 In testing a point null hypothesis 𝐻0 against an alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 based on 
data 𝑥obs, the (two-tailed) P-value is defined as the probability, calculated under the null 
hypothesis, that a test statistic is as extreme or more extreme than its observed value. The 
null hypothesis is typically rejected—and the finding is declared “statistically 
significant”—if the P-value falls below the (current) Type I error threshold α = 0.05. 
 From a Bayesian perspective, a more direct measure of the strength of evidence for 
𝐻1 relative to 𝐻0 is the ratio of their probabilities. By Bayes’ rule, this ratio may be written 
as: 
 
 Pr(𝐻1|𝑥obs)
Pr(𝐻0|𝑥obs)
=
𝑓(𝑥obs|𝐻1)
𝑓(𝑥obs|𝐻0)
×
Pr(𝐻1)
Pr(𝐻0)
≡ 𝐵𝐹 ×  (prior odds), (1) 
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where 𝐵𝐹 is the Bayes factor that represents the evidence from the data, and the prior odds 
can be informed by researchers’ beliefs, scientific consensus, and validated evidence from 
similar research questions in the same field. The effects of multiple hypothesis testing, P-
hacking, and publication bias are to reduce the prior odds of 𝐻1 relative to 𝐻0. Prediction 
markets (3) and analyses of replication results (4) both suggest that for psychology 
experiments, the prior odds of 𝐻1 relative to 𝐻0 may be only about 1:10. A similar number 
has been suggested in cancer clinical trials, and the number is likely to be much lower in 
preclinical biomedical research (5).  
There is no unique mapping between the P-value and the Bayes factor since the 
Bayes factor depends on 𝐻1. However, the connection between the two quantities can be 
evaluated for particular test statistics under certain classes of plausible alternatives (Figure 
1). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Relationship between the P-value and the Bayes Factor. The Bayes factor (BF) 
is defined as 
𝑓(𝑥obs|𝐻1)
𝑓(𝑥obs|𝐻0)
. The figure assumes that observations are drawn i.i.d. according to 
𝑥 ~ 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2), where the mean 𝜇 is unknown and the variance 𝜎2 is known.  The P-value 
is from a two-sided z test (or equivalently a one-sided 𝜒1 
2  test) of the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜇 = 0. 
“Power”: BF obtained by defining 𝐻1 as putting ½ probability on 𝜇 = ±𝑚 for the value of 
𝑚 that gives 75% power for the test of size α = 0.05. This 𝐻1 represents an effect size 
typical of that which is implicitly assumed by researchers during experimental design. 
“Likelihood Ratio Bound”: BF obtained by defining 𝐻1 as putting ½ probability on 𝜇 =
±?̂?, where ?̂? is approximately equal to the mean of the observations. These BFs are upper 
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bounds among the class of all 𝐻1 ’s that are symmetric around the null, but they are 
improper because the data are used to define 𝐻1. “UMPBT”: BF obtained by defining 𝐻1 
according to the uniformly most powerful Bayesian test (5) that places ½ probability on 
𝜇 = ±𝑤, where 𝑤 is the alternative hypothesis that corresponds to a one-sided test of size 
0.0025.  This curve is indistinguishable from the “Power” curve that would be obtained if 
the power used in its definition was 80% rather than 75%. “Local-𝐻1  Bound”: BF =
1
−𝑒𝑝 ln 𝑝
, where 𝑝 is the P-value, is a large-sample upper bound on BF from among all 
unimodal alternative hypotheses that have a mode at the null and satisfy certain regularity 
conditions (5). For more details, see the Supplementary Online Materials (SOM). 
 
Figure 1 shows that a two-sided P-value of 0.05 corresponds to Bayes factors in favor of 
𝐻1 that range from about 2.5 to 3.4 under reasonable assumptions about 𝐻1. This is weak 
evidence from at least three perspectives. First, conventional Bayes factor categorizations 
(6) characterize this range as “weak” or “very weak.” Second, we suspect many scientists 
would guess that 𝑃 ≈ 0.05 implies stronger support for 𝐻1 than a Bayes factor of 2.5 to 
3.4. Third, using equation (1) and prior odds of 1:10, a P-value of 0.05 corresponds to at 
least 3:1 odds (i.e., the reciprocal of the product 
1
10
×  3.4) in favor of the null hypothesis! 
 
Why 0.005? 
 The choice of any particular threshold is arbitrary and involves a trade-off between 
Type I and II errors. We propose 0.005 for two reasons. First, a two-sided P-value of 0.005 
corresponds to Bayes factors between approximately 14 and 26 in favor of 𝐻1. This range 
represents “substantial” to “strong” evidence according to conventional Bayes factor 
classifications (6). 
 Second, in many fields the 𝑃 < 0.005 standard would reduce the false positive rate 
to levels we judge to be reasonable. If we let 𝜙 denote the proportion of null hypotheses 
that are true, (1 − 𝛽) the power of tests in rejecting false null hypotheses, and 𝛼 the Type 
I error/significance threshold, then as the population of tested hypotheses becomes large, 
the false positive rate (i.e., the proportion of true null effects among the total number of 
statistically significant findings) can be approximated by  
 
 
false positive rate ≈  
𝛼𝜙
𝛼𝜙 + (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝜙)
. (2) 
 
For different levels of the prior odds that there is a true effect, 
1−𝜙
𝜙
, and for significance 
thresholds 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛼 = 0.005, Figure 2 shows the false positive rate as a function of 
power 1 − 𝛽. 
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Fig. 2. Relationship between the P-value threshold, power, and the false positive rate. 
Calculated according to Equation (2), with prior odds defined as 
1−𝜙
𝜙
=
Pr(𝐻1)
Pr(𝐻0)
. For more 
details, see the Supplementary Online Materials (SOM). 
 
In many studies, statistical power is low (e.g., ref. 7). Figure 2 demonstrates that low 
statistical power and 𝛼 = 0.05 combine to produce high false positive rates. 
 For many, the calculations illustrated by Figure 2 may be unsettling. For example, 
the false positive rate is greater than 33% with prior odds of 1:10 and a P-value threshold 
of 0.05, regardless of the level of statistical power. Reducing the threshold to 0.005 would 
reduce this minimum false positive rate to 5%. Similar reductions in false positive rates 
would occur over a wide range of statistical powers. 
Empirical evidence from recent replication projects in psychology and 
experimental economics provide insights into the prior odds in favor of 𝐻1 . In both 
projects, the rate of replication (i.e., significance at P < 0.05 in the replication in a 
consistent direction) was roughly double for initial studies with P < 0.005 relative to initial 
studies with 0.005 < P < 0.05: 50% versus 24% for psychology (8), and 85% versus 44% 
for experimental economics (9). Although based on relatively small samples of studies (93 
in psychology, 16 in experimental economics, after excluding initial studies with P > 0.05), 
these numbers are suggestive of the potential gains in reproducibility that would accrue 
from the new threshold of P < 0.005 in these fields. In biomedical research, 96% of a 
sample of recent papers claim statistically significant results with the P < 0.05 threshold 
(10). However, replication rates were very low (5)  for these studies, suggesting a potential 
for gains by adopting this new standard in these fields as well. 
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Potential Objections 
 We now address the most compelling arguments against adopting this higher 
standard of evidence. 
  The false negative rate would become unacceptably high. Evidence that does not 
reach the new significance threshold should be treated as suggestive, and where possible  
further evidence should be accumulated; indeed, the combined results from several studies 
may be compelling even if any particular study is not. Failing to reject the null hypothesis 
does not mean accepting the null hypothesis. Moreover, the false negative rate will not 
increase if sample sizes are increased so that statistical power is held constant.   
For a wide range of common statistical tests, transitioning from a P-value threshold 
of 𝛼 = 0.05 to 𝛼 = 0.005 while maintaining 80% power would require an increase in 
sample sizes of about 70%. Such an increase means that fewer studies can be conducted 
using current experimental designs and budgets. But Figure 2 shows the benefit: false 
positive rates would typically fall by factors greater than two. Hence, considerable 
resources would be saved by not performing future studies based on false premises. 
Increasing sample sizes is also desirable because studies with small sample sizes tend to 
yield inflated effect size estimates (11), and publication and other biases may be more 
likely in an environment of small studies (12). We believe that efficiency gains would far 
outweigh losses. 
The proposal does not address multiple hypothesis testing, P-hacking, publication 
bias, low power, or other biases (e.g., confounding, selective reporting, measurement 
error), which are arguably the bigger problems. We agree. Reducing the P-value threshold 
complements—does not substitute for—solutions to these other problems, which include 
good study design, ex ante power calculations, pre-registration of planned analyses, 
replications, and transparent reporting of all statistical analyses conducted.  
The appropriate threshold for statistical significance should be different for 
different research communities. We agree that the significance threshold selected for 
claiming a new discovery should depend on the prior odds that the null hypothesis is true, 
the number of hypotheses tested, the study design, the relative cost of Type I versus Type 
II errors, and other factors that vary by research topic. For exploratory research with very 
low prior odds (well outside the range in Figure 2), even lower significance thresholds than 
0.005 are needed. Recognition of this issue led the genetics research community to move 
to a “genome-wide significance threshold” of 5×10-8 over a decade ago. And in high-energy 
physics, the tradition has long been to define significance by a “5-sigma” rule (roughly a 
P-value threshold of 3×10-7). We are essentially suggesting a move from a 2-sigma rule to 
a 3-sigma rule. 
 Our recommendation applies to disciplines with prior odds broadly in the range 
depicted in Figure 2, where use of P < 0.05 as a default is widespread. Within those 
disciplines, it is helpful for consumers of research to have a consistent benchmark. We feel 
the default should be shifted. 
Changing the significance threshold is a distraction from the real solution, which 
is to replace null hypothesis significance testing (and bright-line thresholds) with more 
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focus on effect sizes and confidence intervals, treating the P-value as a continuous 
measure, and/or a Bayesian method. Many of us agree that there are better approaches to 
statistical analyses than null hypothesis significance testing, but as yet there is no consensus 
regarding the appropriate choice of replacement (13). Even after the significance threshold 
is changed, many of us will continue to advocate for alternatives to null hypothesis 
significance testing.   
 
Concluding remarks 
Ronald Fisher understood that the choice of 0.05 was arbitrary when he introduced 
it (14).  Since then, theory and empirical evidence have demonstrated that a lower threshold 
is needed. A much larger pool of scientists are now asking a much larger number of 
questions, often with much lower prior odds of success.   
For research communities that continue to rely on null hypothesis significance 
testing, reducing the P-value threshold for claims of new discoveries to 0.005 is an 
actionable step that will immediately improve reproducibility.  We emphasize that this 
proposal is about standards of evidence, not standards for policy action nor standards for 
publication.  Results that do not reach the threshold for statistical significance (whatever it 
is) can still be important and merit publication in top journals if they address important 
research questions with rigorous methods. This proposal should not be used to reject 
publications of novel findings with 0.005 < P < 0.05 properly labeled as suggestive 
evidence. We must reward quality and transparency of research as we impose these more 
stringent standards, and we should monitor how researchers’ behaviors are affected by this 
change. Otherwise, science runs the risk that the more demanding threshold for statistical 
significance will be met to the detriment of quality and transparency. 
 Journals can help transition to the new statistical significance threshold. Authors 
and readers can themselves take the initiative by describing and interpreting results more 
appropriately in light of the new definition of “statistical significance.” The new 
significance threshold will help researchers and readers to understand and communicate 
evidence more accurately. 
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